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The main message of this contribution is that lean times are here to stay for the old member 
states. The main reasons are deep seated: Deteriorating demographics continue with ratio of work-
ing age population to total population falling. There are thus fewer and fewer producers for every 
consumer and recipient of transfers. On top of this productivity growth is declining as labour quality is 
falling and investment growth slowing. In the new member countries the demographic trends also 
unfavourable, but they are (more than) compensated by catch up growth as a relatively well edu-
cated work force finds its place in the internal market. 
What does this diagnosis imply for the role of structural policies? No Lisbon agenda change 
demographics trends, nor can it change the declining capital/labour ratio due to insufficient invest-
ment growth. But structural reforms might counteract the impact of these two negative trends. More-
over, the performance gap between big and small member countries suggests that policy can make 
a difference.  
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1. Introduction 
This contribution will focus on the plight of the (most of) of the old Member States as the new 
member states are unlikely to cause particular problems. The latter are growing faster than the old 
EU-15 and are likely to continue to benefit from their position as a low cost production base with a 
relatively well educated work force within an improving policy framework and close to the biggest 
market in the world. 
By contrast the main theme of the Euroland economy continues to be weakness of both de-
mand and supply. And it is not only the economy that is weak. Any observer of economy policy 
making Europe must be struck by the deterioration in the quality of economic policy in general. 
This can be seen on many fronts: fiscal policy plans go constantly awry, the Lisbon agenda is con-
stantly invoked but no action is taken, etc. I would argue that this disarray among policy makers 
can be explained by the fact that the existing policies and institutions are geared for a growing 
economy in which every year growth allows for some redistribution. Growth prospect are now 
rather dim throughout most of Euroland due to lower productivity growth and, particularly in Ger-
many, due to demographic developments. Economic policy making is thus squeezed on two sides. 
The fall in potential growth implies a squeeze on the potential for re-distribution, and this mat-
ters because it has an impact on both fiscal and monetary policy. Fiscal policy is deteriorating as 
finance ministers try to save and then discover every year that despite their attempts at cutting ex-
penditure the ratio of public expenditure to GDP does not go down and that, year after year, defi-
cits are higher than expected. What they fail to understand is that measures that would have re-
dressed the balance ten years ago are now barely sufficient to avoid even larger deficits. 
Monetary policy is less directly affected by the slowdown in growth and the vanishing space of 
redistribution. Judging from its own predictions the ECB has also been slow to recognise the fall in 
potential growth and has thus regularly overestimated growth prospects and underestimated infla-
tion. However, the magnitude of the error, about half a percent per annum was such that price sta-
bility has not seriously put in danger. This might change when the pressure on economic policy 
increases. Experience shows that price stability cannot be maintained when there is extreme pres-
sure on public finances as, for example, during wars. This is where the danger lies. The long run 
impact of ageing on public finance in Europe is actually comparable to the cost of a major war (see 
Deutsche Bank (2004)). 
The slowdown in productivity is analysed in more detail below. The short term impact of demo-
graphic developments is less well known and might be documented first. 
2. From demographic bonus to malus 
That the European population is ageing rapidly is widely know. What is not widely appreciated 
is that the impact of ageing will not felt only in 20-30 years, but it has already today a major impact 
on the economies of some member countries.  
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A first important point is that the word “ageing” does not describe adequately the problem 
Europe is facing. It is true that average life expectancy is increasing continuously in all developing 
countries. But the main reason why the proportion of the elderly is now expected to almost double 
over the next 50 years in Europe is that on average fertility has fallen so much below replacement 
levels so that natural population growth has now turned negative, and will stay negative for the 
foreseeable future. Lower birth rates imply of course that the average age of the population in-
creases. It is important to realise that low birth rates are a phenomenon that is specific to Europe 
(and Japan), but not the US as can be seen from the demographic projections for the EU and the 
US presented below.
1 
This table concentrates on old age dependency ratios, which constitute a measure of the con-
sequences of ageing for public finances since an increasing proportion of elderly implies higher 
pension and health expenditures. This table shows that for the EU-15 the old age dependency will, 
on average, double by the year 2050 to reach over 50%. By contrast the dependency ratio of the 
US will increase much less and will remain about a third lower than that of Europe. Among the ma-
jor member countries Germany stands out as having to face a considerably faster ageing process 
than France, for example. It is also apparent that there is little difference between the EU-15 and a 
larger EU-28, as even the inclusion of Turkey would not change the average much. In relative 
terms the deterioration is even bigger for the EU-28 than for the EU-15, whose dependency ratio 
‘only’ is likely to increase by the year to 2.1 times its 2000 level whereas this ratio increases to 2.25 
times its 2000 level for the EU-28. 
Table 1. Old age dependency projections 
Dependency ratio, %   
2000 2025 2050 
Japan 25.1  47.0  64.6 
USA 18.8  29.3  34.6 
France 24.5  36.0  45.9 
Germany 24.2  39.4  52.9 
EU-15 24.4  36.1  51.0 
EU-28 21.5  31.9  48.5 
Sources: US Census, http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html, own calculations. 
The old age dependency ratio is widely used to illustrate the pressure on pension systems. 
However, a better indicator for the overall impact of demographic factors on the economy (and thus 
the pressure on economic policy) might be the simple ratio of the working age population to overall 
population. The level of this ratio measures in a certain sense potential GDP per capita. Changes 
in this ratio show, ceteris paribus, to what extent the room for re-distribution is affected by demog-
raphy. For example, if this ratio increases by one percent, potential GDP per capita should go up 
by one percent ceteris paribus, i.e. holding constant productivity, employment rates, etc. A fall in 
this ratio indicates the opposite, potential GDP per capita falls, implying that there is less to re-
distribute to pensioners and other interest groups. 
If one looks at the evolution of this indicator for Germany, it becomes apparent why the ‘Um-
verteilunskampf’ has become much tougher over the last years. During the five years preceding 
                                                  
1 These projections are already based on the assumption that fertility in Europe will somewhat recover than that the in-
crease in life expectancy will slow down.  
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reunification demographic factors were providing a strong backwind for economic policy as the ra-
tio of working age population to total population was increasing by about 0.8% per annum. By con-
trast during the five years up to 2005 demographic factors provide a headwind to economic policy 
as this ratio starting falling rapidly after 1995, deterioration during the last five years was equivalent 
to about 0.54% per annum. The total deterioration between the late 1980s and now thus amounts 
to almost 1.5% per annum. The German economic system, which until the end of the 1990s could 
count every year on a demographic bonus was simply not prepared for this change. The sails had 
been set for wind from aft and the country was not able to adjust to the fact that now the wind is 
blowing from the bow. 
It is interesting to see that France is in a quite different situation: its demographic situation 
evolves more slowly, with the important deterioration coming only during the next decade. The US 
has a similar pattern as France, but with a somewhat more pronounced deterioration over the next 
ten years. In the US the demographic factors will change from plus 0.7% per annum now to around 
minus 0.2 in the five years to 2015, which is equivalent to a negative change of over 0.8% per an-
num over the next ten years (just when the budget is supposed to be brought again under control). 








1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030





The ageing process has thus already today a strong economic impact in some member coun-
tries. The data for of Germany, which remains the largest economy of Euroland seems to represent 
the worst case: a combination of rapidly worsening demographic factors and lower productivity 
growth. This combination is behind the loss of control over fiscal policy in Germany and must also 
be the main explanation of why the half hearted reforms undertaken so fare have been insufficient 
to turn the economy around. Other member countries face less extreme pressure because their 
demography evolves more smoothly, but few member countries will be able to escape the twin 
pressures from worsening demography and productivity on economic policy. 
Figure 2 below shows the same demographic data for the largest new member state (Poland) 
and some of the cohesion countries among the old EU-15 and Turkey to provide a comparison.  
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The latter, Turkey, constitutes an interesting case as it is in the midst of a demographic transi-
tion, reflecting a fairly rapid decline of the population growth rate, from the 2.5 to 3.0 percent range 
in the 1950s and 1960s, to close to 1.4 percent, at the beginning of the new century. This implies a 
rising proportion of the 15 to 64 age group in the total population, starting from a low base, as 
fewer new babies are born to fill the below 15 age group, and as life expectation, while lengthen-
ing, is not yet long enough to result in a large proportion of the total population above age 64. This 
results in demographic bonus in the form of a large hump shaped curve which puts Turkey well 
above all current and perspective member countries (e.g. Spain and Portugal), whose demo-
graphic ‘transition’ happened a generation earlier. The Spanish and Portuguese curves thus are 
below that of Turkey and anticipate its movements by about 20 years. 
Poland is a special case because of the horrendous losses the country suffered during World 
War II. This implies that until 2015 there will be each year fewer pensioners falling out of the labour 
force. However, after 2015 the low birth rates will make themselves felt in rapidly deteriorating 
demographic situation.). 
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3. The productivity slowdown 
The eurozone has now gone through an unprecedented three years of near stagnation. Was 
this just a cyclical phenomenon; due to a combination of external shocks and wrong macroeco-
nomic policy responses? In the short to medium run cyclical and structural factors always interact 
in a way that makes it next to impossible to disentangle their relative importance. One thing is 
clear, however. This is that long term potential growth rates have fallen in Europe. This is not just 
because of lower population growth; productivity growth has fallen as well as extensively docu-
mented in previous reports of this group (see Gros et al. (2001), (2002) and (2003)). This section 
will first, report some new evidence on the causes of the slowdown of productivity in Europe. Sec-
tion 2.2 then turns to some interesting differences in performance within the Euroland economy.  
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3.1 Growth potential 
How could one find out whether there has been a structural slow-down in Europe? In view of 
Blanchard (2004), who has drawn attention to the fact that the level of output per man hour in 
some important member countries is close to the US level, it might be best to concentrate immedi-
ately on hourly productivity. The table below (taken from Daveri (2004)) shows how the growth rate 
of GDP per hour worked has fallen from around 2.6% p.a. during the first half of the 1990’s to less 
than 1.5% p.a. since 1995. It is not possible to argue that this fall just reflects a cyclical phenome-
non since the period since 1995 was not worse in terms of business cycle than the period 1990-
1995, which contains a recession which a fall in real GDP, whereas during the period 1995-2002 
GDP growth was always positive. 
The key fact shown in table 1 is thus that productivity as measured by GDP per hour fell by 1.2 
percentage points at a time when the opposite happened in the US (there hourly productivity 
growth increased by 0.8% points). Given this discrepancy between the European and the Euro-
pean data it is not possible to argue that the dismal performance of the European economy over 
the last years is just a result of a negative shock coming from the global business cycle emanating 
from the US. 
Table 2. Growth of GDP per hour worked in the EU and the US, 1979-2001 
Total economy , OECD data  1970-80  1980-90  1990-95  1995-02  (1995-02) minus 
(1990-95) 
European Union 11  3.6  2.3  2.6  1.4  -1.2 
USA  1.6 1.4 1.2 2.0  +0.8 
EU11 minus USA  +2.0  +0.9 +1.4  -0.6  -2.0 
Source: Daveri (2004), EU-11instead of EU-15 because of limited data availability. 
Why should productivity growth have fallen in the EU? It is often argued that the difference EU-
US can be explained by the advantage of the US in new technologies, i.e. mainly information tech-
nologies (IT). However, the gap in IT between the EU and the US cannot help to explain why 
Europe’s performance should have deteriorated if measured against its own past. Europe might be 
slow to adopt IT, but it certainly has not turned away from IT, hence the causes for the slowdown in 
Europe (as opposed to the transatlantic gap) must be sought elsewhere. One reason for the pro-
ductivity slowdown in Europe might be quite simple: total factor productivity growth (TFP) might 
have declined. 
A definite answer to the question whether capital of TFP was behind the EU productivity slow-
down of the 1990s cannot be given yet. Any answer is still tentative because the data necessary to 
address this issue is available only for a subset of EU countries. The limited available information 
suggests, however, that a slow down in capital deepening – rather than diminished TFP growth – is 
the main culprit for the European slowdown. 
This conclusion emerges when one decomposes the growth rates of value added per hour 
worked into their capital deepening, TFP growth and labour quality growth contributions for the US 
and the aggregate EU-4. In turn, the capital deepening component is usefully further split into an IT 
capital component and a non-IT capital component. 
The results tabulated below suggest first of all that the European productivity slowdown is 
mostly due to diminished capital deepening of non-IT goods only. Second, TFP growth has not  
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much changed, continuing at the respectable rates of about one percentage points reached in the 
past. The slowdown in the growth rate of labour productivity in the business sector for the EU ag-
gregate – milder for the four countries considered here than for the EU-15 – is more than ac-
counted for by the diminished contribution of non-IT capital (-.45 percentage points) and the wors-
ening in labour quality, which has contributed another negative .15 percentage points. 
On the positive side, instead, business sector productivity has benefited from an increase in 
the already positive contribution from IT capital (up from .3 to .5 percentage points) and from the 
slight increase in TFP growth (from .9 to 1.05 percentage points). Hence, at least for the overall 
business sector, one has to concur with Jorgenson (2003) saying that TFP as well as accumulation 
of IT capital are unrelated to the European growth slowdown of productivity. This marks a sharp 
contrast with the US, where TFP growth markedly accelerated, moving from a contribution of .25 to 
more than 1 percentage points per year and the contribution of IT capital jumped up almost half a 
percentage point (from .4 to .8 percentage points). 
Hence, the evidence, based on the better data available today, comes essentially confirms the 
findings in Daveri (2000, 2002) and CEPS (2001, 2002), where rough overall measures of IT capital 
and TFP were employed. Other sources (e.g. Commission 2003) report a small decline in TFP, 
which might appear to be inconsistent with the data reported here. However, the data available for 
the EU-15 does not account for changes in labour quality, whose effects are thus attributed to TFP. 
The more detailed data for the quality of the labour force, which is available only for the EU-4 sug-
gests, however, that part of the apparent decline of TFP might have been due to a deterioration of 
labour quality. How could labour quality diminish when the general level of education is constantly 
increasing? The resolution of this puzzle seems to lie in the fact that during the late 1990s the share 
of the lower skilled in the workforce increased. This had been the aim of many labour market re-
forms, but it had the side-effect that average labour quality declined and with it overall productivity. 
Table 3. Decomposing aggregate labour productivity growth, business sector 
 US  EU-4 
Business sector  1979-95  1995-00  1979-95  1995-00 
Labour productivity growth  1.21  2.46  2.30  2.02 
Contributions to labour productivity growth from: 
IT capital  .46  .86  .33  .53 
Non-IT capital  .35  .43  .70  .25 
TFP growth  .26  1.05  .94  1.07 
Labour quality  .13  .13  .33  .18 
Source: Daveri (2004). 
The more detailed data necessary to distinguish between TFP and labour quality is available 
only until 2000. This implies that the period covered by the table below comprises just the upswing 
following the 1995 recession. If follows that this data is likely to overestimate productivity growth 
and in particular TFP. If one compares periods that are similar in business cycle terms as done 
above (i.e. using the 1995-2002 period) the fall in overall productivity would be much larger and the 
performance of TFP would be likely to be much worse. But the detailed data to perform this exer-
cise is not yet available. 
Could one expect productivity to improve again over the next few years?  
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One way of addressing this question is to start with the official Lisbon goal in terms of employ-
ment. It is not widely appreciated that there is a capital deepening counterpart to the Lisbon em-
ployment goal. One of the policy goals stated in Lisbon for the European Union to reach by 2010 is 
raising the EU (-15) employment rate – the ratio of total employment over total working age popula-
tion – to 70%. Given that the current employment rate in the EU(-15) is about 63%, this implies an 
increment of about 1 percentage point per year in the next seven years or so. In turn, if population 
in working age keeps growing at the past rates of about 0.5 percentage points per year – an aver-
age of 0.3 p.p. for the native population and 1.2 p.p. for immigrants – total employment has to go 
up by 1.5% per year until 2010 to meet the Lisbon employment goal. This is a bit higher than 
1.25%, the growth rate of total employment averaged in the EU(-15) in 1995-2002. But it is not un-
feasible, at least in principle. If coupled with a continuation of the long-run trend towards a reduc-
tion of average hours worked (about half a percentage point per year), this translates into an ex-
pected increase of the labour input of about 1% per year from here to 2010. 
What does this imply in terms of capital deepening, i.e. the growth contribution of capital to 
productivity growth? To come up with an educated guess, the past growth rates of the capital stock 
for the whole economy (e.g. for 1996-2000) have to be projected into the future. Based on the data 
in Inklaar, O’Mahony and Timmer employed in the main text, one can get estimates ranging be-
tween 0.8% per year for France and 4.2% per year for the UK, with Germany and the Netherlands 
in between (but much closer to Germany). Hence, a simple continuation of past accumulation rates 
would imply a growth rate of the capital stock of about 3% per year for the EU4. The corresponding 
growth rate of the capital stock per hour worked would be 2% per year and the growth contribution 
from capital deepening would be equal to two thirds of a percentage point per year (at least as long 
as the value added share of capital stays unchanged at one third). This compares with 0.78 per-
centage points computed for the EU4 in 1995-2000. 
All in all this amounts to saying that, if the Lisbon employment goal is taken seriously, it would 
require a much higher investment effort for capital deepening to take off again and contribute more to 
productivity growth in the next few years through 2010. If capital accumulation stays constant the 
contribution from capital deepening would then fall even a bit more, implying that at unchanged rates 
of TFP growth overall productivity might actually fall a bit more (or at least not recover noticeably). 
On top of the capital deepening effect there would an adverse impact on labour quality as the 
additional employment would have to come from that part of the labour force that is at present un-
employed, i.e. the lower skilled. The data reported above suggests that this could lead to a further 
loss of productivity growth of 10-20 basis points. Hence one would need a considerable increase in 
capital deepening just to keep productivity from falling. 
Under unchanged rates of capital accumulation there is thus a clear contradiction between two 
Lisbon goals: to increase productivity and to increase employment. Figure 2.2 shows this in terms 
of the two headlines goals: reaching an employment rate of 70% (more or less the US value) and 
reaching a productivity level of 100% of that of the US. 
At the beginning of 1990s the Soviet successor states started to transform their financial sec-
tors to meet the needs of the emerging market economies.  
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The nature of economic relations under central planning left little role for financial intermedia-
tion, as it is understood in mature market economies. Banks were the only source of external fund-
ing in the socialist economies. State enterprises had virtually no budget constraints and when they 
experienced credit or liquidity shortages a bank would provide credit based on investment and pro-
duction decisions by central planning bodies. Because banks merely implemented credit allocation 
decisions of the central planner, they did not evaluate risks, make their own credit allocation deci-
sions, or monitor the use of credits after their issuance. 
The start of transition meant that banks had to supply increasingly sophisticated financial ser-
vices – without the capacity to do so. Banks had to learn how to assess, pool, and diversify risks, 
collect and process information on their clientele, and to exercise control over borrowers. The tasks 
facing policymakers were equally challenging. These included the imperative of introducing the 
market-oriented regulatory institutions needed to protect the rights of creditors and shareholders; 
setting up independent and strong prudential supervision; maintaining a level playing field in terms 
of tax policies; and privatizing state banks. Second, governments had to learn to carry out policies 
in a manner friendly to the financial sector. The early attainment and subsequent maintenance of 
macroeconomic stability were also critically important. 
Following a decade of transition, results differ. Although the Baltic states were able to build 
quite successful financial systems, in the CIS countries financial systems remain a major obstacle 
to sustainable economic growth. The hyperinflations of the early 1990s, the financial scandals that 
followed the collapse of monobank systems, and subsequent incomplete progress in constructing 
non-bank financial institutions and effective regulatory structures have had adverse consequences. 
These include weak bank balances sheets, high real interest rates, and poor access to capital for 
small enterprises and start ups. With a few exceptions, non-transparent regulation, inadequate dis-
closure frameworks, and weak protection of shareholders rights continue to limit investor participa-
tion in CIS financial markets. Despite significant investor interest in emerging market debt, only 
Kazakhstan has been willing and able to float new Eurobonds since 1998. The absence (Kazakh-
stan again is the exception) of effective three-pillar pension systems in CIS countries further limits 
the demand for domestic debt and equities. 
Fortunately, there are signs of improvement, thanks in large measure to the region’s recovery 
from the effects of the August 1998 Russian financial crisis. Bank lending and deposits are growing 
in many CIS economies, the proportion of bad debt in bank credit portfolio is falling, and lending and 
deposit interest rate spreads are diminishing. The solid economic growth recorded since 1999 in 
many CIS countries is helping memories of the 1998 financial crisis to fade, and stock exchanges in 
some CIS countries are currently at or near record levels. Financial systems in CIS economies may 
be moving toward the successful frameworks put in place in the new EU member states. However, 
because they have not benefited from the extensive foreign direct investment that recapitalised 
banks in Central Europe, financial stability in many CIS countries remains open to question.  
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Notes: “Employment growth” is the growth rate of total employment; “Productivity growth” is the growth rate of GDP per 
employed person. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
3.2 Big and small: lessons for a more flexible Europe? 
The growth performance of the eurozone has been disappointing – at least if one looks at the 
average. But this average also hides considerable variability across countries. Can one discern 
any systematic pattern in cross-country variability across Europe? The answer seems to be yes if  
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one compares the performance of the large and the small EMU states. Since the start of EMU the 
three largest euro area member states (France, but particularly Germany and Italy) have consis-
tently underperformed on almost any account. As they together represent three quarters of the 
GDP of the eurozone their sluggishness is behind the underperformance of the eurozone (and of 
the EU) if compared not only to the present US, but also the past performance of the EU itself. 
Since 1999 the growth rates of the three ‘euro-dinosaurs’ have been 1.6 percentage points 
lower on average than those of the 8 small euro area member countries. (see Figure 5) This im-
plies a total underperformance of 10 % over this six year period. (The new member states have 
tended to perform even better, but this is natural given that they are still in a catch-up process.) 
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The large and persistent differences in performance across countries within the euro zone con-
tain an important message: since monetary policy has been the same for all members of the euro-
zone it is thus unlikely that an overly tight monetary policy was responsible for the poor growth per-
formance of the eurozone. 
It is interesting to note that the much better growth performance of the smaller countries has 
been accompanied by much healthier public finances. The Figure below shows that the 8 smaller 
euro area member countries have on average run a budget ‘close to balance’, as required by the 
Stability Pact. Did their better growth performance come in spite of or because of this fiscal strict-
ness? The facts suggest that the latter might be closer to reality since over the last years the 
smaller countries have maintained their lead in terms of growth, and at the same time, the differ-
ence in fiscal policy has increased. Maybe the leaders of the big three should reflect more on the 
long term benefits of a strong fiscal policy, rather than band together to bend the rules against ex-
cessive deficits according to their short term political preferences.  
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The much tighter fiscal policy pursued by the smaller euro area countries does not seem to 
have reduced their growth, but it did have a strong impact on their debt levels. A decade ago the 
smaller euro area countries had a slightly higher debt ratio than the big-3. This changed radically 
over the last ten years. The smaller countries have now a debt ratio that is about 20 percentage 
points of GDP lower than that of the big-3, whose ratio actually increased over the last decade, and 
has stagnated at a high level since the start of EMU. The smaller countries are thus much better 
prepared to tackle the fiscal implications of population ageing and they will also be much less af-
fected by any future increase in interest rates. 
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Why are smaller countries able, on average, to perform better? Inflation was somewhat higher 
in the smaller countries so that they faced also lower real interest rates. But his factor alone would  
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not be enough to explain a growth differential of this size. A more fundamental factor that that might 
play an important role is that the ‘Big-3’ have more structural adjustment to undergo. Table 4 below 
provides some summary data on the small-large divide. There is one area in which the larger 
economies see a source of strength transformed into a handicap: this is the relatively high weight of 
industry in their economies. As long as markets were separated the larger member countries of-
fered a larger home market and were thus a better location for industry than their smaller EU part-
ners. With the single market and the euro this comparative advantage has disappeared. At the 
same time the competitive pressure on industry increases, not only from the worldwide process of 
globalization, but also because of enlargement. In the past the rather high share of industry in em-
ployment in the Big-3 (21 % of the workforce) might have been a source of strength. Today it is a 
problem that might explain part of their underperformance, at least if compared to the smaller mem-
ber countries where the share of industry is at 15 % of the workforce already much lower. (Not to 
speak of the US, where it is even lower.) The new member countries have for the time being also a 
rather large share of industry. But given that exports of industrial goods is the only way in which 
they can export their relatively abundant supply of labour this is for the time being not a handicap. 
Table 4. Large versus small 
Averages 1998-2004  Big 3  Small 8  France  Germany  Italy  NMS  US 
Real GDP growth  1.3  2.7 2.0 0.8 1.2 4.6 4.4 
Fiscal  balance  -2.4  0.0 -2.6 -2.4 -2.10  -4.0 -1.8 
Labour productivity growth  0.7 1.7 1.0 0.9 0.3 3.9 2.3 
Share of industry  20.5  17.6 16.2 21.8 23.3 24.6 12.3 
Source: own calculations based on AMECO data. NMS= New Member States. 
The problem with adaptation to the inevitable trend de-industrialisation of modern economies is 
the one key element that distinguishes France from the other tow large Euroland economies, Ger-
many and Italy. France has a lower share of its population in industry and is on this account closer 
to the smaller member countries than to its big neighbours East and South. This might also be the 
reason why France performs somewhat better on productivity. 
Smaller member countries are not just lucky in that they happen to have less of a problem with 
de-industrialisation. They have also clearly been able to react much better to the shocks that have 
buffeted the world economy recently. External shocks, such as the 9/11 terrorists attacks or the Iraq 
war are routinely used as an excuse the weakness of the European economy. This assertion can be 
tested in a simple way: if it were true one would expect that small countries should be hit stronger 
than the large countries because the smaller member countries have much larger exposure to the 
rest of the world than the larger member countries. However, the data indicate exactly the contrary. 
As the Figure above showed the small euro area countries have continued to outperform the ‘big 
three’ (D+F+IT) by a considerable margin even during the turbulent period since 2001. 
4. Weak supply leads to weak policies? 
A negative shock to supply can lead to negative second round effects by the stress it puts on 
macroeconomic policy. I discuss here two policy fields in which this has clearly been happening 
recently, namely fiscal and structural policies.  
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4.1 The crumbling of fiscal policy discipline 
To safeguard against a relapse into past fiscal policy profligacy EU governments in 1997 con-
cluded the Stability and Growth Pact. The purpose of the pact was to provide a framework for the 
operation of the excessive deficit procedure, enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty, within EMU. There 
can be little doubt that fiscal discipline remains indispensable to ensure government solvency in 
the longer run against the background of an ageing population, and that the Stability and Growth 
Pact, albeit far from perfect, remains the best available instrument for trying to enforce discipline. 
Unfortunately, during the first few years of EMU, when growth was strong, poor implementation 
of the Pact allowed countries to run structural deficits (partially because the ongoing slowdown in 
potential growth was ignored). This set the stage for trouble during the more recent phase of eco-
nomic weakness. As economic growth dropped close to stagnation in 2001-03, pressure on budget 
deficits rose, forcing governments to choose between tough (and possibly pro-cyclical) spending 
cuts to meet the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact and a weakening of the budget 
constraints. With both Germany and France, the heavyweights in the EU and EMU, having difficul-
ties adhering to fiscal policy discipline, it is no surprise that the Council of Ministers opted for sof-
tening the budget constraint. 
Box 1. Key points of the SGP – old and new 
 Old  New 
Small overshoot of deficit per-
mitted if: 
Exceptional event (natural disaster) 
Recession with GDP falling by more than 2%
In addition if there are structural reforms or 
spending on 
Research and development 





Excessive deficit possible if:  Drop of GDP by more than 2% 
Drop of GDP by more than 0.75% if down-
turn sudden, output gap positive, exceptional 
circumstances 
In addition if economy is stagnating or grow-
ing very slowly 
Time to correct excessive 
deficits: 
One year after establishment  Additional time when growth is slow 
Implementation of fiscal ad-
justment programmes 
Within 4 months  Within 6 months 
Medium-term fiscal policy 
goals 
Balanced budget or surplus  1% deficit if low debt or high potential 
growth, balanced budget or surplus other-
wise 
Fiscal policy in good times    0.5% per year deficit reduction 
exceptional revenue earmarked for debt re-
duction 
early warning 
In a “reform” of the Pact agreed in March 2005, the Council decided to make the exceptions in 
case of a violation of the 3% deficit limit more generous; to allow a number of “extenuating circum-
stances” in case of deficits above 3% of GDP; and to lengthen the periods within which excessive 
deficits have to be slashed (see box). As a result, the threat of sanctions for running an “excessive 
deficit” has faded into the background and fiscal discipline is eroding. Thus, in their recent fiscal 
projections from April 2005, the EU Commission expected no further reduction in budget deficits at 
the Eurland level and forecasted France, Italy, Portugal and Greece to run deficits in excess of 3% 
of GDP by 2006. The ratio of government debt to GDP, which fell from 76.1% for the euro area as  
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a whole in 1996 to 69.4% in 2001-2002, has already increased again in 2003-04. The risk is now 
high that it will continue to increase also in the medium-term future. With the inevitable rise in age-
related public spending coming in the next decade, a serious crisis of government finances in 
many Euroland countries within the next 10-15 years is now a distinct possibility. 
The standard defence of this weakening of the SGP has been that countries should not be 
forced into an overly hasty fiscal adjustment. However, there is a clear long term cost associated 
with allowing countries to run larger fiscal deficits: public dis-savings tend to crowd out private in-
vestment. There is a large literature on the extent of this phenomenon and one could argue that in 
an area that has access to the world capital market it does not really matter how much the gov-
ernment (dis-)saves since private investment can still be financed by capital imports, if needed. 
Figure 8. Investment and Governments saving 
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We do not wish to review this complex of arguments in detail here. We simply point out that in 
reality, larger deficits have been associated with lower investment over the last years. Figure 8 
shows the tight relationship that one can observe over the last years. If this relationship were to 
prove stable one could conclude that an elimination of the structural deficits, which now are over 2 % 
of GDP should increase investment by about 1 percentage point of GDP. As we showed above that 
a declining capital labour ratio is one of the causes of the productivity slowdown it is apparent that 
there will a cost to be paid for the abandonment of fiscal discipline in term of lower growth in future. 
4.2 The unravelling of structural reform 
The Lisbon Agenda was Europe’s answer to the competitive challenges coming from low cost 
and high quality suppliers abroad. A key part of this agenda was completion of the internal market 
especially for services, which was expected to inject new dynamism into the European economy 
through greater competition in a sector accounting for about 70% of employment and GDP (see 
box below). The Lisbon Agenda was to be complemented by structural reform on the national level, 
especially in the areas of tax, labour market and regulatory policy.  
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Five years on, the achievements have been truly disappointing. At the EU level, a major and 
perhaps fatal blow was delivered to the Lisbon Agenda in March 2005, when the services directive 
was sent back by the European Council to the Commission for a comprehensive overhaul. Most 
importantly, the critics of the Commission’s draft have questioned the country-of-origin principle in 
the mutual recognition of regulations, which is at the heart of the single market. According to the 
critics, this principle, which allows providers to offer their services within the EU under home regu-
lations, leads to unfair competition and “social dumping”. As suppliers based in high cost, densely 
regulated countries would be pushed out of the market, there would be a “race to the bottom” in 
regulations and social protection. To safeguard against this, the critics want to reduce the country-
of-origin principle to the exception and make the country-of-destination principle, where service 
providers have to observe the rules in the consuming country, the rule for the supply of services. 
The result would be a higher level of protection of high-cost service suppliers and the continuing 
fragmentation of the European services market. 
Box 2. Services Directive 
It is often overlooked that, until its presentation in early 2005, the Services Directive had been presented as one of the 
cornerstones of the Lisbon strategy. The Commission document motivates the proposal thus (Brussels, 5.3.2004 
COM(2004) 2 final/3): 
“This proposal for a directive is part of the process of economic reform launched by the Lisbon European Council with a 
view to making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. Achieving 
this goal means that the establishment of a genuine internal market in services is indispensable. It has not hitherto been 
possible to exploit the considerable potential for economic growth and job creation afforded by the services sector be-
cause of the many obstacles2 hampering the development of service activities in the internal market. This proposal forms 
part of the strategy adopted by the Commission to eliminate these obstacles and follows on from the Report on the State 
of the Internal Market for Services3, which revealed their extent and significance.” 
The Commission underlines the importance of the services directive thus: 
“Services are omnipresent in today's economy, generating almost 70% of GNP and jobs and offering considerable poten-
tial for growth and job creation. Realising this potential is at the heart of the process of economic reform launched by the 
Lisbon European Council and aimed at making the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in 
the world by 2010. It has not so far been possible to exploit fully the growth potential of services because of the many 
obstacles hampering the development of services activities between the Member States.” 
The Commission proposal is also part of the Lisbon agenda: 
In March 2000, the Lisbon European Council adopted a programme of economic reform aimed at making the EU the 
most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world by 2010. In this context, the EU Heads of State 
and Government invited the Commission and the Member States to devise a strategy aimed at eliminating the obstacles 
to the free movement of services
4. 
At the same time, national governments’ efforts at structural reform have also run out of steam. 
Politicians have taken a cautious approach to reform as they have feared the ire of their elector-
ates. Hence, in the last few years, euro area governments have eased tax burdens somewhat, re-
duced regulations to a certain extent, and eased restrictions in certain segments of the labour mar-
ket. All this were steps in the right direction, but the measures were not comprehensive enough to 
engineer a clear turnaround in the labour market and push GDP growth higher. With the results of 
                                                  
2  "An Internal Market Strategy for Services", Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, COM(2000) 888 final, 29.12.2000. 
3  Report from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on “The State of the Internal Market for Ser-
vices", COM(2002) 441 final, 30.7.2002. 
4  Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 24.3.2000, paragraph 17. The need to take action in these fields 
was also highlighted at the Stockholm and Barcelona Summits in 2001 and 2002.  
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reform disappointing, electorates have become dissatisfied with structural reform and are increas-
ingly leaning towards backward-looking protectionist policies. Politicians eager to deflect from their 
own failings and to raise their standing with a disgruntled public are catering to these sentiments by 
questioning the rationale of an open, market-oriented economy. The risk is growing that the politi-
cal backlash over the unsuccessful implementation of reform will lead to protectionist policies in 
Euroland, raising economic inefficiencies and dampening economic growth even more. 
Towards the end of the last millennium, some observers were wondering whether the first ten 
years of the new millennium would not turn into the decade of Europe. To some extent, these 
hopes for a European revival were reflected in the ambitious goal set in the Lisbon agenda 
launched in 2000 to create “the most dynamic knowledge-based economy of the world by the end 
of this decade”. In view of the experience of recent years and with only five more years to go to 
meet the goal, we may now conclude that this is very unlikely to be Europe’s decade. In fact, future 
economic historians may well conclude that this was the decade when the secular decline of 
Europe was reaffirmed. The fall of the Berlin Wall at the end of the 1980s appeared to open a new 
future for Europe. However, the 1990s consolidated the US’ political and economic weight in the 
world. At the beginning of the decade, Europe set itself high political and economic goals. Most 
likely, it will miss both. With the rise of Asian countries in recent years, Europe is most likely to end 
the decade as a shrinking political and economic power, continuing and reaffirming a trend that 
began with World War One. 
5. Concluding remarks 
This contribution has documented the structural weakness of the eurozone, or rather its larges 
member countries (F, D and IT). It is apparent that even the best structural reforms cannot change 
some fundamental parameters. Structural reforms cannot change negative trends in demographics 
and, at least not directly, in a declining capital labour ratio. But it is also clear that reform can help. 
The example of smaller euro member countries shows that better performance is possible. How-
ever, the rejection in early 2005 of the draft directive on liberalising trade in services by countries 
such as France and Germany suggests that some countries are resisting this lesson. 
Why then has policy not improved? The key reason is that policy decisions are determined by 
short term considerations. This applies in particular to fiscal policy which is now governed by a mix 
of political expediency and some primitive Keynesian ideas. In this context the long-term objectives 
and issues are often forgotten: Two of these long-term considerations are particular germane for 
Europe today: 
1) Ageing makes surpluses today desirable to prepare for ageing 
2) Deficits crowd out investment! 
This suggests that a fiscal policy oriented towards the long run could produce a ‘double divi-
dend’: it would prepare governments for ageing and it should crowd in investment, making it easier 
to maintain the capital labour ratio and hence productivity growth. What is needed today is thus not 
only structural reforms, but also a structural reform of fiscal policy. The reform of the Stability and  
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Growth Pact agreed in early 2005 at the instigation of France and Germany, but with almost 
unanimous support, suggests, unfortunately that policy makers are going in the opposite direction, 
they are looking for excuses to continue a policy that emphasises short term expediency at the ex-
pense of longer run gains. 
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